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 Abstract  This chapter explores the idea that phylogenetic diversity plays a unique 
role in underpinning conservation endeavour. The conservation of biodiversity is 
suffering from a rapid, unguided proliferation of metrics. Confusion is caused by 
the wide variety of contexts in which we make use of the idea of biodiversity. 
Characterisations of biodiversity range from all-variety-at-all-levels down to variety 
with respect to single variables relevant to very specifi c conservation contexts. 
Accepting biodiversity as the sum of a large number of individual measures results 
in an empirically intractable framework. However, large-scale decisions cannot be 
based on biodiversity variables inferred from local conservation imperatives because 
the variables relevant to the many systems being compared would be incommensu-
rate with one another. We therefore need some general conception of biodiversity 
that would make tractable such large-scale environmental decision-marking. We 
categorise the large array of strategies for the measurement of biodiversity into four 
broad groups for consideration as general measures of biodiversity. We compare 
common moral justifi cations for the conservation of biodiversity and conclude that 
some form of instrumental value is the most plausible justifi cation for biodiversity 
conservation. Although this is often interpreted as a reliance on option value, we opt 
for a broadly consequentialist characterisation of biodiversity conservation. We 
conclude that the best justifi ed general measure of biodiversity will be some form of 
phylogenetic diversity. 
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 Introduction 
 It is not surprising that there is a bewildering array of tools available to those who 
would measure  biodiversity . There are of course countless respects in which organ-
isms and ecosystems vary. More importantly, there are many types of scientifi c 
projects which exploit different aspects of biodiversity. In  What is biodiversity ? 
( 2008 ) Maclaurin and Sterelny argue that, although it began as an idea primarily of 
interest to conservation biologists, there are now many areas of the life sciences in 
which biodiversity plays an ontological, explanatory or predictive role. 
 Moreover, within conservation biology the role of  biodiversity has become com-
plex. When biodiversity was fi rst envisaged in the 1980s it was intended as a new 
organising principle for conservation. In many respects it was to be a replacement 
for the old idea that conservation was fundamentally about preserving species and 
the even older idea that it is essentially about preserving wilderness (Nash  1990 ). 
But alongside this idea of biodiversity as an  overarching  goal of conservation, our 
new understanding of the effects of  diversity on ecology, genetics, and morphology 
allows us to harness particular aspects of biodiversity to achieve specifi c conserva-
tion goals. So now biodiversity takes its place both as a goal for policymakers and 
as a tool for conservation biologists. In both contexts, biodiversity is diffi cult to 
measure. For this reason, much of the growth in biodiversity metrics has been in the 
development of new and more effective biodiversity surrogates. 
 In this complex theoretical and methodological landscape, is phylogenetic  diver-
sity just one more tool to be used as and when appropriate? In this chapter, we focus 
on conservation biology and argue that phylogenetic diversity plays a unique role in 
underpinning conservation endeavour. 
 In the fi rst section we argue that the conservation of  biodiversity is suffering 
from a rapid, unguided proliferation of metrics. These various measures will be 
categorized by what they aim to pick out and preserve. We then scrutinise the justi-
fi cation for various types of measures as fundamental principles underpinning 
large- scale conservation (we explain why ‘large-scale in the next section) and argue 
that this role is best performed by phylogenetic  diversity . 
 A Maze of Measures 
 Our current understanding of  biodiversity is a mess. It is a fortunate, productive, and 
useful mess but a mess none the less. This can be traced to the lack of a guiding set 
of standards from which to assess the value of proposed biodiversity measures. 
Although measures are tested, the testing has often been piecemeal across conserva-
tion biology and related disciplines leading to confl icts over whether a metric has 
been proved. An example is the debate between Ross Crozier et al. ( 2005 ) and Dan 
Faith and Andrew Baker ( 2006 ) over assessing conservation schemes which use 
phylogenetic  diversity for data sets that include systematized taxa without 
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phylogenies. While Crozier et al. claim that this study is a “proof of  concept ”, what 
they take to be an examination of phylogenetic diversity’s applicability  to  conserva-
tion projects in the fi eld, Faith and Baker claim that such examinations were already 
conducted a decade ago! The lack of a guiding set of standards has resulted in dif-
fi culty compiling and comparing measurement procedures in an environment in 
which new measures are proliferating. It is noted that “in the last decade more than 
two measures of Phylogenetic  Diversity or Functional Diversity were proposed, 
each year!” (Cianciaruso  2011 ). This has resulted in measurement options for bio-
diversity increasing without a clear way of choosing between them. This prolifera-
tion of varied, uncategorized measures is referred to by Faith and Baker as the 
“curse of biodiversity informatics” or “bio-miss-informatics” (Faith and Baker 
 2006 ). 
 The proposed measures of  biodiversity are of course, not limited to phylogenetic 
 diversity . There are measures aimed at describing biodiversity using many different 
accounts of functions, abundance measures, ecosystem services, and hybrids of all 
of the above. The description of these measures is inconsistent throughout biology 
because; “The vocabulary used to classify indices is continuously evolving and dif-
fers between evolutionary and ecological studies, leading to potential confusion 
when a term is employed without a clear defi nition or reference” (Pavoine and 
Bonsall  2011 ).  Biodiversity particularly suffers from ambiguity regarding biologi-
cal features scientists and policymakers are referring to when they say an ecosystem 
has high biodiversity. 
 Individuals and groups have tried to build consensus around which features are 
worthy of measurement. One recent attempt to collect an index of measures that are 
fundamental to  biodiversity notes that; “a key obstacle is the lack of consensus 
about what to monitor” (Pereira et al.  2013 , p. 277). The authors propose a set of 
“Essential  Variables of  Biodiversity ”. These include:
•  Genetic composition e.g. allelic  diversity 
•  Species populations e.g. Abundances and distributions 
•  Species traits e.g. phenology 
•  Community composition e.g. taxonomic  diversity 
•  Ecosystem structure e.g. habitat structure 
•  Ecosystem function e.g. nutrient retention 
Each of these “variables” can be measured using multiple (sub-) variables. For 
example ecosystem function in their account includes nutrient retention in a  com-
munity . This would include the cycling of Nitrogen, Carbon, and Phosphorous 
through a community, amongst other important nutrients. Biological features such 
as species traits not only need to be individuated but there are also numerous differ-
ent mathematical measures for that trait description to decide between. All these 
variables, their sub-variables, and the different measurement procedures for the sub- 
variables are understood as actual measures of  biodiversity (although for any real 
ecosystem the majority of these variables will be unanalysed). To what then do we 
refer when we talk of biodiversity as a conservation goal? According to these 
authors, we refer to the sum of all these ‘essential’ aspects of biological  diversity . 
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 This permissive and conciliatory view of  biodiversity , while at fi rst seeming 
attractive, is problematic as a guide to conservation. Accepting biodiversity as the 
sum of a large number of individual measures results in an empirically intractable 
framework. Large- scale conservation requires prioritisation of effort and resources 
across disparate ecosystems. The many available biodiversity measures make such 
decisions diffi cult. In all ecosystems there will be incompletely analysed variables. 
So either policymakers and conservationists accept that many assessments of biodi-
versity are incommensurate with one another or they must subscribe to schemes for 
weighting the various measures. In practice, the relative weighting of the many 
variables will often be treated as equal but there is an open question as to whether 
we  should treat each  variable as equal. Should ecosystem biomass be treated as 
equally important as plant trait disparity? If not then we will have to agree on a 
seemingly arbitrary rubric of relative weights for the various features being mea-
sured. In short, the retention of such a large swath of essential measures creates 
problems for the practice of conservation. 
 We accept that the many measures representing the  diversity of biological sys-
tems can be relevant to particular contexts in conservation and their accuracy and 
utility can be assessed through experimentation or modelling (Pereira et al. criti-
cally assess measures through their “scalability, temporal sensitivity, feasibility, and 
relevance”, p. 277). But as a whole, the use of  biodiversity as a foundational tool in 
conservation biology suffers from a glut of information that is hard to integrate in a 
useable way. Those who agree with Michael Soulé’s ( 1985 , p. 727) well-worn 
description of conservation biology as a crisis discipline, are likely to think such 
confusion can only get in the way of effi cient decision-making.  Biodiversity should 
be a useful  concept across disciplines and sites. 
 Local conservation imperatives often point to particular  biodiversity variables to 
which we should pay attention, e.g. focus on genetic  diversity is crucial in trying to 
bring a single species back from the brink of extinction. However, not all conserva-
tion is local. Governments and NGOs must prioritise conservation strategies applied 
to different ecosystems and applied at different scales, e.g. governments must weigh 
the conservation value of: conserving endangered species, developing national 
parks, regulating fi sheries, and decreasing carbon emissions. 1 Such large- scale deci-
sions cannot be based on biodiversity variables inferred from local conservation 
imperatives because the variables relevant to the many systems being compared 
would be incommensurate with one another. For the reasons noted above, it is 
impractical to interpret biodiversity in such large-scale contexts as the sum of all the 
biodiversity variables of all the systems being compared. We therefore need some 
general or fundamental conception of biodiversity that would make tractable such 
large-scale environmental decision-marking. In what follows, we shall refer to this 
as a  general measure of biodiversity . 
1  Of course some of these are not purely conservation decisions, but all rest to some important 
extent upon judgements about the value of natural systems. 
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 One of Many Biodiversities 
 In thinking about large- scale differences in  biodiversity , we often employ a  concept 
of biodiversity which is very broad. Sarkar et al. claim biodiversity is “ diversity at 
every level of taxonomic, structural, and functional organization of life” (Sarkar 
et al.  2006 ). The  Convention on Biological Diversity ( CBD ) proposes that biodiver-
sity is “diversity within species, between species, and of ecosystems” (CBD  1992 ). 
According to such defi nitions, any mathematical measure that categorizes biologi-
cal difference and preferentially organizes that difference is a measure of biodiver-
sity (including many unimportant and unused metrics e.g. diversity of spottiness as 
quantifi ed by the number of non-contiguous circular patterns averaged over the 
members of a species). 
 This broad characterisation of  biodiversity has permitted a range of targets of 
measurement such as species  richness , species  diversity , ecosystem function, spe-
cies function, population relations, ecosystem diversity, biomass, genetic diversity, 
phylogenetic diversity, and many more. In what follows we collect these measures 
into broad categories and assess each as the basis for a general measure of biodiver-
sity. We begin by tackling a couple of red herrings. 
 Measures We Rule Out 
 A general measure of  biodiversity must be capable of guiding large- scale and long- 
term conservation effort. We think this rules out two types of biodiversity measures: 
biodiversity surrogates and measures based on ecosystem services. Both are, of 
course, important tools in conservation, but for the reasons set out below, they can-
not underpin a general measure of biodiversity. 
 Surrogates of  Biodiversity 
 As noted above, most of the growth in  biodiversity metrics has been in the develop-
ment of new surrogates for biodiversity, i.e. measures of features whose presence is 
correlated with high biodiversity. If biodiversity measurement is to succeed as a 
large- scale goal of conservation, then we must be able to assess the success of bio-
diversity surrogates and we can only do that if we understand what it is that these 
metrics are surrogates for. Sarkar et al. ( 2006 ) argue that “general biodiversity is too 
diffuse a term to be precisely defi ned”. The best we can do is to agree to “some 
convention or consensus about what constitutes the relevant features of biodiversity 
in a given context”. We think this ‘nothing but surrogates’ view of biodiversity mea-
surement, in effect, risks giving up on the idea of biodiversity as an overarching goal 
 for  conservation. Crucially this convention-based view on how we should 
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characterise biodiversity appears not to rest on underlying principles for the assess-
ment of the conventions underpinning such a consensus on biodiversity 
measurement. 
 On our view, a general measure of  biodiversity must be defi nable (or at least 
capable of clear characterisation) and it must be a feature of biological systems that 
we can practically assess across clades and ecosystems. This is essential if such a 
measure is to assist us in forging large- scale conservation policy. Moreover, it must 
not itself be a surrogate for some further more basic characteristic of living systems 
that can also be measured across clades and ecosystems. 
 Anthropogenic  Variables 
 The idea of ecosystem services as a foundation for a general measure of  biodiversity 
is fraught with diffi culty. This is partly because the whole idea of ecosystem ser-
vices is at best very open ended. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment report 
( 2005 ) defi nes ecosystem services as “benefi ts people obtain from ecosystems”. 
Despite gallant attempts to assess the global value of ecosystem services in dollar 
terms (e.g. Costanza et al.  1997 ), many of the psychological and social benefi ts are 
diffi cult to measure even at small scales and, as a group, the benefi ts people obtain 
from ecosystems seem incommensurate with one another (Boyd and Banzhaf  2007 ). 
Moreover, while ecosystem services are usually interpreted as inventories of current 
benefi ts to humanity, conservation is inherently forward-looking and it is even more 
diffi cult to accurately assess the benefi ts that species and ecosystems will provide to 
our descendants. Indeed, even if we could agree on a reliable set of measures and 
agree on a way to aggregate them, many environmental ethicists and many members 
of the public would balk at the idea that only human interests need be taken into 
account in conservation decision-making (see for example Stone  1972 ). So although 
ecosystem services are an important driver of conservation effort, we think this tool 
is too limited to form a plausible basis for a general measure of biodiversity. 
 The idea of  biodiversity should capture the diverse features of life not the diverse 
interests of people. While we grant to Reyes et al. ( 2012 ) that there is ‘functional 
overlap’ between these two features of biological systems we agree with Faith 
( 2012 ) that ecosystem services and biodiversity are distinct. It is in the interests of 
humanity to preserve biodiversity, but this fact does not warrant defi ning biodiver-
sity in terms of current human needs and interests. Moreover, there is practical util-
ity in keeping these ideas separate. Differentiating between ecosystem services and 
biodiversity has allowed research into whether these features co-vary and what bio-
diversity targets yield ecosystem services (Benayas et al.  2009 ; Mace et al.  2012 ; 
Worm et al.  2006 ). In certain cases we may want to prioritize the maintenance or 
reinstatement of ecosystem services. Differentiating the services from the  diversity 
serves to distinguish such conservation that focuses squarely on the economic and 
social needs of human populations. 
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 The Main Candidates 
 As noted in the previous section, current broad characterisations of  biodiversity 
permit a range of targets of measurement including species  richness , species  diver-
sity , ecosystem function, species function, population relations, ecosystem diver-
sity, biomass, genetic diversity, phylogenetic diversity, and many more. In this 
section, for the sake of manageability, we categorise that large array of strategies 
into four broad groups for consideration as general measures of biodiversity. 
 Species  Diversity and Species Richness 
 Species  diversity is an intuitively simple  concept that has yielded numerous math-
ematical explications combining species  richness , the number of species in an  area , 
species  evenness , and the relative abundance of species (see Maurer and MacGill 
 2011 ).  Species richness is extremely common as a measure of  biodiversity , partly 
due to its relative ease of discovery. It is a key  variable from which many diversity 
metrics are constructed infl uencing the output of species diversity, functional, 
genetic, and phylogenetic measures. It is, in many contexts, a good indicator of 
biodiversity. Holmes Rolston goes as far to claim that species richness  is biodiver-
sity as “(s)pecies are a more evident, mid-range, natural kind” as opposed to other 
proposed units of biodiversity like genetic diversity or ecosystem diversity (p. 402, 
Rolston  2001 ). 
 Species richness is usually supplemented with other information as just counting 
the species present gives limited insight into the dynamics of an assemblage. Often 
species  richness is combined with species  evenness to create many of the common 
species  diversity measures. 2 This is based on the idea that, given a species richness 
in an  area , species diversity increases when the populations have more even abun-
dances and vice versa. Information theory has provided the most common indices 
of species diversity, the Shannon evenness and the Simpson evenness indices. Other 
measures include: Hill’s Indices, Hurlbert’s “Interspecifi c encounter Index”,  Rao ’s 
“Quadratic Entropy” Index, and Fager’s Indices (See Justus  2011 ; Maurer and 
Macgill  2011 ). 
 While there is a range of ways that species  diversity is calculated there is one 
feature common to these measures. Measures of species  richness and diversity are 
blind to each individual species’ identity. No species is treated as being more valu-
able to than any other. This assumption is directly rejected by measures that priori-
tize species by any of their individual features including morphology, genetics, or 
phylogeny. 
2  For a sceptical take on the success of such measures see Justus ( 2011 ). 
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 Function and Morphology 
 Functional diversity , as it is commonly used, is a subset of trait  diversity . Functional 
 traits are commonly morphological traits differentiated by the effects the trait has on 
an ecosystem (Petchey and Gaston  2006 ). Some ecologists have rejected the need to 
associate ‘functional’ traits to ecosystem effects and treat function diversity as a 
synonym of morphology. Evan Weiher ( 2011 ) in his summary of functional diver-
sity measures states, “Some have suggested the term ‘functional diversity’ be 
restricted to measures of trait diversity that affect the functions of ecosystems 
(Tilman et al.  2001 ; Petchey and Gaston  2006 ). We should be wary of unnecessarily 
restrictive defi nitions for terms that are conceptual, general, or useful” (pg. 175). He 
further notes that general morphological trait space can be differentiated without 
reference to a schematic for differentiating traits. The dizzying range of mathemati-
cal measures for dividing morphological space include: distance measures, dendro-
gram-based measures, variance-based measures including abundances, trait 
 evenness , convex hull mathematics to measure trait volume, and graph theory (See 
Weiher  2011 ). 
 Genetic  Diversity 
 Genetic  diversity is considered by many to be the lowest level of a nested hierarchy 
of diversity comprising of genetic diversity, species diversity, and  community diver-
sity (Culver et al.  2011 ). Culver et al. suggest that genetic variation is “the essence 
of all  biodiversity ” (p. 208). Genetic barcoding of populations has become increas-
ingly common due to the effi ciency of new sampling techniques and the increase in 
computational power. Clearly, there will in the future be more genetic information 
available to researchers that will aid, not just our understanding of genetic differ-
ence, but also our assessments of other forms of diversity such as species diversity 
and phylogenetic diversity. Despite its clear practical importance, it is implausible 
that genetic diversity should underpin a general measure of biodiversity. This is 
partly because genes vary greatly in their effects so that the amount of raw genetic 
difference between two populations tells you relatively little about the extent to 
which they differ functionally and ecologically. It is also partly due to the undoubted 
importance of non-genetic factors in both ecology and evolution (Laland et al.  1999 ; 
West-Eberhard  2003 ; Jablonka and Lamb  2005 ). 
 Phylogenetics and Phylogenetic  Diversity 
 Phylogenetic inference recreates the branching structure of evolutionary relation-
ships between species via cladistic analysis from molecular and morphological data 
in the form of discrete character states or distance matrices of pairwise 
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 dissimilarities (Vandamme  2009 ). The computational models used differ both in 
methodology and epistemological grounding; prominent methods include Maximum 
Parsimony, Maximum Likelihood, and Bayesian Methodologies. Phylogenetic dis-
tance measures aim to quantify the relatedness of groups of species. As  the  phylo-
genetic tree represents the evolutionary relations between species it can also be used 
to calculate how distinct these species are relative to the tree in which they are 
nested. Methods differ in the way they characterize distance and uniqueness. Some 
do it in terms of speciation events and others in terms of change in genomes between 
species. Following Velland et al. ( 2011 ), we distinguish two types of fundamentally 
different measures of phylogenetic  diversity (p. 196):
 Node - based trees represent only  topology . They are based only on information 
about speciation events and so we can infer from them only facts about related-
ness. Such measures include: Taxonomic Distinctness (Vane-Wright et al.  1991 ) 
and Species  Originality (Nixon and Wheeler  1992 ). 
 Distance - based trees include topological information as well as  branch length . 
Branch length either represents the accumulation of evolutionary change or alter-
natively the passage of time. Such measures include:  PD (Faith  1992 ,  1994 ); 
 Originality of Species within a Set (Pavoine et al.  2005 ); Pendant Edge 3 (Altschul 
and Lipman  1990 ) and Species Evolutionary History (Redding and Mooers 
 2006 ). 
Both groups of methods represent speciation and its creation of distinct evolution-
ary trajectories and both provide, with varying degrees of success, a means to priori-
tize the conservation of phylogeny and therefore of species that are particularly 
distinct in their features and history. 
 The Roles of Phylogenetic  Diversity 
 Although the role of phylogenetic  diversity in conservation biology is open-ended, 
extant uses can be categorised into three distinct groups.
  (i)  Phylogenetic  Diversity  as a tool for prediction and explanation 
 Conservation is only possible when we have a good understanding of the 
dynamics of communities and ecosystems. Although we often think of this in 
ecological terms, evolution is an important contributing factor. In such  contexts 
the measurement of phylogenetic  diversity can help us distinguish these com-
ponent forces at work. For example, all else being equal, we expect species that 
are closely related to be both morphologically similar and similar in the func-
tional roles that they play in the ecosystems in which they are found. So we can 
use phylogenetic diversity to predict functional similarity. Such studies allow 
3  Note “Pendant Edge” is a recent name (e.g. Redding, and Mooers  2006 ; Vellend et al.  2011 ) given 
to the idea introduced but not named in Altschul and Lipman’s original very brief discussion note. 
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us to detect cases that stand in need of special explanation. These are cases 
where functional diversity is either higher (over- dispersion ) or lower (func-
tional diversity defi cit) than expected (see for example Webb et al.  2002 ). The 
appropriateness of particular metrics will depend upon the explanatory or pre-
dictive target, although we note that common metrics show strong correlation 
with one another in many circumstances (Vellend et al.  2011 , p. 207). 
  (ii)  Phylogenetic diversity  as a surrogate 
 Phylogenetic diversity has been employed as a surrogate for a wide variety 
of valuable features of ecological communities and ecosystems. For example, 
Srivastava et al. ( 2012 ) argue that phylogeny largely determines interactions 
among species, and so could help predict the cascade of extinctions through 
ecological networks and hence the way in which those extinctions impact 
ecosystem function. So, on this account, phylogenetic  diversity is at least a 
surrogate for ecosystem function. 
 Forest et al. ( 2007 ) fi nd a stronger correlation between phylogenetic  diver-
sity and feature diversity than between species diversity and feature diversity. 
So they recommend that we employ phylogenetic diversity, rather than species 
diversity, as a surrogate for feature diversity. Faith et al. ( 2010 ) argue that we 
should recognise phylogenetic diversity as a surrogate for features of value to 
human well-being:
 We argue that an evolutionary perspective is essential for developing a better under-
standing of the links between  biodiversity and human well-being. We outline the ser-
vices provided by evolutionary processes, and propose a new term, ‘evosystem 
services’, to refer to these many connections to humans. (Faith D.P. et al.  2010 , p. 66) 
 (iii)  Phylogenetic diversity  as a conservation goal 
 The third context in which one might employ phylogenetic  diversity is as a 
goal of conservation. There are certainly examples of phylogenetically orien-
tated conservation. The  Edge of Existence Programme ( www.edgeofexistence.
org ), run by the Zoological Society of London, focuses explicitly on the con-
servation of species that are endangered and phylogenetically distinct. There 
are many other conservation programmes that take phylogenetic diversity into 
account (e.g. WWF’s  Global 200). That said, phylogenetic diversity is not as 
widely used in conservation as it might be (Winter et al.  2012 , p. 1). This is 
partly for methodological reasons:
 Phylogenetic diversity has long been incorporated in planning tools, but it has not yet 
had much impact on conservation planning. Applications face limitations of available 
data on phylogenetic  pattern . (Sarkar et al.  2006 ) 
 It is also partly due to scepticism about the correlations claimed above:
 In our opinion, the justifi cation for preserving phylogenetic  diversity as a proxy for 
functional diversity or  evolutionary potential has so far largely failed. Our current 
knowledge of the benefi ts to the (future) functioning of ecosystems and securing evo-
lutionary potential remains equivocal. (Winter et al.  2012 , p. 4) 
 Clearly there is limited employment of phylogenetic  diversity as goal for 
large- scale conservation decision-making. There is also some skepticism about 
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our empirical and philosophical justifi cation for such uses. In the fi nal section 
of this chapter it is this question about justifi cation to which we turn. 
 Moral Justifi cations for a General Measure of Biodiversity? 
 We have argued that large- scale conservation decision-making would  benefi t from 
agreement on a general measure of  biodiversity , one that is not tied to particular 
projects or contexts. We have set out a group of broad categories of measurement 
strategies with the aim of determining whether one of these might furnish an appro-
priate general measure. In this section, we set out a similarly broad brush taxonomy 
of philosophical justifi cations for the conservation of biodiversity with the aim of 
determining whether any of those available might provide a justifi cation for conser-
vation based on a general measure of biodiversity and hence might provide us with 
a basis for inference about the nature of such a general measure. We will argue that 
the best justifi cation is one that respects the plurality of human and non-human 
interests in biodiversity as well as uncertainty about how best to secure those inter-
ests and about future changes both in the environment and in human affairs. 
 Philosophical justifi cations for the conservation of  biodiversity come in many 
forms but all such arguments fall into one of four categories. 
 Intrinsic Value 
 The idea that  biodiversity  has  intrinsic value is enshrined in the Convention on 
 Biodiversity . It is also a central tenet of deep ecology (Naess  1986 ). Despite its com-
mon currency, intrinsic value is capable of multiple interpretations which causes 
considerable confusion in moral reasoning (O’Neill  1992 p. 119). At least two inter-
pretations are plausible in the current context. 
 One is the idea that  biodiversity  has  intrinsic value in the sense that it has value 
over and above its instrumental value. This interpretation is further dependent on 
what we count as ‘instrumental’. If we tie instrumental value to narrow economic 
purposes, then there seems to be considerable non-instrumental value in biodiver-
sity. If we tie it to a broader set of psychological benefi ts (provided by recreation, 
aesthetic appreciation etc.) then the domain of non-instrumental value seems cor-
respondingly smaller and more diffi cult to characterise. 
 A second interpretation is that  biodiversity has intrinsic value in the sense that it 
is valuable independently of the valuations of valuers. It does after all seem that the 
biosphere would remain a locus of value even if some selective extinction event 
caused the demise of humanity or even the extirpation of all species capable of rea-
soning about value. But value in this sense seems almost impossible to quantify 
precisely because it cannot be tied to evaluative judgements made by economic 
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actors or by environmental stakeholders. The best we seem to be able to say is that 
some people, when asked, assent to the existence of such value. 
 Intrinsic value is controversial as a justifi cation for the conservation of  biodiver-
sity for two reasons. Firstly, there is philosophical controversy about whether such 
forms of value exist (Norton  1984 , p. 145). Secondly, as it is independent of human 
projects and human values, it is unclear how it should be measured and hence, how 
it should be conserved. There seems no way in principle of choosing between vari-
ety of ecosystems, variety of species, variety of form and function or variety in 
genetic make-up etc. as loci for biodiversity’s intrinsic value. On the other hand, if 
intrinsic value is only a justifi cation for the conservation of biodiversity in the very 
broad sense (set out at the end of section “ Measures we rule out ”), that will leave us 
no further along the path in the project of understanding or employing a practical 
general measure of biodiversity. 
 Human Emotional Responses to the Natural World 
 It is also claimed that  biodiversity is valuable because the psychological makeup of 
human beings causes them to feel an intimate connection with the natural world 
which might be expressed variously in emotions such as love of, or respect for, 
nature. The idea that such emotional responses are a result of our evolved psychol-
ogy was promoted by Wilson ( 1984 ) and Kellert and Wilson ( 1993 ). We note that 
the so-called Biophilia Hypothesis has received limited  support in the literature 
(Simaika and Samways  2010 p. 903), but let us assume for the moment that we do 
share a common innate love of nature. 
 There are two important problems with grounding conservation in common emo-
tional responses. Firstly, such responses are not always reliable guides to rational 
action. There is after all some fundamental fact about human beings that also causes 
them to see cigarettes as valuable. We don’t think that this implies that we should 
‘conserve’ cigarettes, because we don’t think that this common emotional response 
is adaptive. Human beings feel positively disposed toward all sorts of things that are 
not actually good for us. But if we must then judge the adaptiveness of our feelings 
toward  biodiversity , it seems that conservation justifi ed thereby would not be a con-
sequence of our feelings towards biodiversity, but rather of the utility of biodiversity 
to human populations (to which we turn shortly). Secondly, people clearly differ a 
great deal in the extent to which they feel positive emotions toward biodiversity 
(Einarsson  1993 ). If a general measure of biodiversity is to be inferred from 
 emotional responses to biodiversity, then it seems that we will either have to dis-
count the responses of outliers or average across a relatively large range of responses. 
 Finally, this style of justifi cation for conservation suffers from the same prob-
lems as conservation based  on  intrinsic value. Even if it were true that almost every-
one attached the same equally strong positive emotion to the conservation of the 
biosphere, it is hard to see how we could turn universal love of nature into a practi-
cally applicable general measure of  biodiversity . For these reasons, we think it 
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implausible that common emotional responses to nature will justify general mea-
sure of biodiversity. 
 Instrumental Value 
 The benefi ts conferred by  biodiversity on humanity (and indeed on other species) 
are themselves diverse (aesthetic, ecological, economic, epistemic etc.). Moreover, 
as Elliott Sober ( 1986 ) so eloquently points out, species differ a great deal in their 
apparent instrumental value. The great majority of species have small geographic 
ranges, do not perform unique ecological functions within their ecosystems and are 
not currently of important economic or psychological value to human populations. 
So Sober asks whether these facts justify the ‘rational attrition’ of species whose 
instrumental value is very small or unknown. This question about whether we 
should conserve ‘unremarkable species’ is closely related to the question of whether 
we should employ a general measure of biodiversity which would see us conserve 
species and ecosystems over and above those currently known to be of  important 
 instrumental value. 
 The strongest reason for conservation based on a general measure of  biodiversity 
is that preferences or circumstances are likely to change so as to make valuable 
some proportion of the species in question. It is true that we have at times been 
overenthusiastic in our predictions about the possible future value of biodiversity 
such as the claims about the future value of bioprospecting in the Convention on 
 Biodiversity (for more detail, see Maclaurin and Sterelny  2008 , pp. 164–7). It is also 
true that a great deal of economic value resides in ecosystems that have low  diver-
sity , viz farms. That said, there has been huge growth in our appreciation for, and 
enjoyment of, natural variety through ecotourism, national parks, eco-sanctuaries 
etc. As noted in section “ Measures we rule out ”, there is also evidence that biodiver-
sity is correlated with a wide range of ecosystem services. Furthermore, we should 
be careful not to base our predictions about future value on current categories. Just 
as ecotourism and bioprospecting are relatively recent ideas, we may in future dis-
cover new types of endeavour which place the value of extant species in a new light. 
In short, there is a  prima facie reason for conservation based on a general measure 
of biodiversity, namely that we hedge our bets against an uncertain future. This idea 
was originally proposed by McNeely et al. ( 1990 ) as an instance of option value, 4 
but the use  of  option value in this context has been controversial.  Option value is an 
idea imported from economics. It is essentially a willingness-to-pay measure—the 
additional amount a person would pay for some amenity over and above its current 
value in consumption to maintain the option of having that amenity available for the 
future (van Kooten and Bulte  2000 , p. 295). Although one of us has previously 
4  This idea has been championed particularly by Dan Faith. For excellent discussions of the option 
value represented by  biodiversity see Faith ( 1992 ,  1994 ,  2013 ). 
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expressed enthusiasm for the option value idea (Maclaurin and Sterelny  2008 , sec-
tion 8.4) we now think that the answer lies elsewhere. 
 The crucial problem  with  option value is that it ties the value of  biodiversity to 
judgements about value made by ordinary people (consumers in the economist’s 
terms). Clearly actual assessments of such option value will be diffi cult (Norton 
 1988 ). Even if we could assess such judgements, human beings are not good at 
reasoning about risk and they have limited biological knowledge. So it might be that 
people’s actual assessments about the option value in natural systems would be very 
poor guides to the likely effects of conservation on future human communities or on 
future ecosystems. If we hedge our bets to maximise future outcomes then we 
should do so based on our best information about the probability of such outcomes 
rather than on the estimates that consumers might make about such outcomes. 
 In light of these issues, the value of  biodiversity is better analysed as an instance 
of consequentialism, broadly applied. We should conserve biodiversity, not because 
people want to, but because doing so will on average lead to better outcomes for 
people and human communities of perhaps more broadly for moral patients (organ-
isms capable of experiencing suffering). 5 
 However, even the consequentialist interpretation faces an important objection 
developed at length in chapter 6 of Maier ( 2012 ). It might be objected that our 
uncertainty about future states of the biosphere and future goals and preferences of 
people implies that conservation based on a general measure of  biodiversity is as 
likely to produce net harm as it is net  benefi t (after all, the species we are conserving 
include many whose effects on human populations are currently unknown). 
 There are of course instances in which  diversity works against us, as when we are 
 threatened by a diversity of pathogens. That said, ours is an extremely successful 
species with an extremely broad niche. We have become adept at harnessing a great 
variety of features of the natural world to an astounding variety of ends. The number 
of species that pose a serious threat to humanity is a vanishingly small proportion of 
the total species count. Moreover, a great number of weeds and pests are not harm-
ful in their native habitat, but only become harmful when that habitat is radically 
disturbed or when they are introduced by humans into other ecosystems (Baker 
 1974 ). 
 We therefore think it implausible that conserving unremarkable species will on 
average produce more harm than  benefi t . Put another way—were possible, at the 
press of a button, to destroy all those species and biological communities not known 
to be of special value to humanity, we think it would be irrational to do so. Humanity 
(and perhaps other suffi ciently sentient species) would almost certainly be worse 
off. So where we cannot assess the likely payoff for conserving an individual unre-
markable species, it is nonetheless rational to assume that that payoff will be posi-
tive. This does not of course tell us anything about how large such a payoff will be 
and we acknowledge that there is an interesting and diffi cult question about weigh-
ing the benefi ts of such conservation against the opportunity cost of forgoing alter-
5 Although not explicitly consequentialist and still somewhat confusingly called option value, the 
approach taken by Faith ( 2013 , p. 72) is similar to the current proposal. 
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native projects (e.g. if we used conservation funding to fi ght diseases or conservation 
land to grow more food for burgeoning populations in poor countries). However, we 
note that this problem of assessing opportunity costs is a global one, affecting all 
aspects of public policy and hence too large a topic to treat here. Our purpose is to 
determine how we should in general rank and assess biological systems as candi-
dates for conservation. We leave it to others to determine how what proportion of 
total human effort ought to be spent on conservation. 
 Phylogenetic Diversity as a General Measure of Biodiversity 
 We have argued that the best general justifi cation for the conservation of  biodiver-
sity comes from its instrumental value. We also note that there are many types of 
such value and that the consequences of conservation focused on instrumental value 
in general are inherently uncertain. The nature and location of aesthetic, recre-
ational, and other cultural values will inevitably be subject to disagreement. 
Moreover, we are not in possession of the full facts about the ways in which existing 
species and ecosystems can  benefi t (or harm) us and we know even less about the 
effects that conserved species and ecosystems will have on us and our descendants 
in the future. Can we harness this uncertainty as a means of developing a general 
measure of biodiversity? 
 We have argued that, leaving aside species whose value is currently well under-
stood e.g. charismatic megafauna, economically important crops etc., we are war-
ranted in spending some amount of time and effort in the large- scale conservation 
of  biodiversity via some general measure. So we should conserve at least some of 
Sober’s unremarkable species on the grounds that they might be valuable in some 
respect, but we cannot predict which respect that will be. This implies that a general 
measure of biodiversity should not aim at conserving particular features, but rather 
at conserving a maximal variety of features. 
 While it is sensible under some circumstances to measure variety of features or 
of functions, characterisation of overall biological  diversity (of the sort attempted 
by Numerical Taxonomy) fails on philosophical grounds. It is not possible to cap-
ture differences in morphology 6 across the whole range of biological form because 
the idea of the occupation of morphospace makes sense only where we can anchor 
the dimensions of some particular morphospace to actual biological characteristics 
of closely related species (Maclaurin and Sterelny  2008 , p. 15). The idea of a global 
morphospace is logically untenable because, as Goodman ( 1972 , p. 437) argues, 
similarity and difference only make sense if we have some antecedent means of 
6  Note that in treating this problem is essentially about morphology, we are running form and func-
tion together. This is because we think that, were we to measure all biological form and all biologi-
cal function, the two groups of characteristics would intersect at the level of physiological traits. 
So any attempt to develop an overall measure of functional  diversity will face the same problems 
that must be overcome in the development of an overall measure of morphological diversity. 
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specifying the properties (or in the case of a morphospace, the dimensions) to be 
analysed. In taxonomy this almost always results in a focus on homologies. So in 
most cases the measurement of actual morphological diversity is best achieved by 
anchoring our analysis to actual differences in groups of related species, because 
only relatively closely related species differ in ways that make the analysis of mor-
phospace tractable. 7 
 So while broad difference in form and function is what the moral argument tells 
us to conserve, it cannot be measured directly in a way that would  benefi t large- 
scale conservation decision-making. Nonetheless, we can develop a general mea-
sure of  biodiversity by exploiting the evolutionary processes that cause functional 
and morphological divergence within lineages. Both measures of species  diversity 
and of phylogenetic diversity exploit evolution in just this way. If studies like those 
of Forest et al. ( 2007 ) are right, a general measure of biodiversity should be based 
on phylogenetic diversity, as that will best maximise feature diversity. We therefore 
conclude that phylogenetic diversity ought to play a fundamental role in conserva-
tion biology as the foundation of a general measure of biodiversity. That said, we 
noted in section “ A maze of measures ” that there are many measures of phyloge-
netic diversity. If conserving phylogeny is justifi ed as a means of hedging our bets 
against uncertainty, this may help us to wrangle the current diversity in measures of 
phylogenetic diversity discussed earlier. 
 Variety in topological measures of phylogenetic  diversity refl ects the fact that 
phylogeny is complex. Species do not always bifurcate cleanly. Lineages reticulate 
and so on (Dagan and Martin  2006 ). Does this imply that, at large scales, phyloge-
netic diversity is undefi ned? We fi rst note that such diffi cult cases are the exception 
rather than the rule at least across most of  the  phylogenetic tree. Secondly there are 
modifi cations of standard accounts of phylogenetic diversity designed to account 
for such phenomena as polytomies (see for example May  1990 ). Clearly over- 
dispersion studies (see the above discussion of Webb et al.  2002 ) are at least based 
on the assumption that it is possible to make large  scale phylogenetic comparisons 
between very different systems. We cannot, in principle, construct a theoretical 
morphospace that contains humans and fungi and tardigrades, but we can compare 
their phylogeny. However, there is an important caveat. Large-scale phylogenetic 
diversity is tractable using topological measures of phylogenetic diversity and time- 
based distance measures, but it less obviously so for trait-based distance measures 
of phylogenetic diversity. 
 The more we incorporate form and function into a measure of phylogenetic 
 diversity , the less plausible it is to think that you can compare phylogenetic diversity 
in this very rich sense between distantly related clades. Use of distance-based trees 
incorporating information about character evolution for such purposes requires the 
further assumptions (1) that there is a fact of the matter as to what we should count 
7  See for example the very wide variety of morphospaces discussed in McGee ( 1999 ,  2007 ). 
Indeed, it is notable that discussion of “convergent evolution in theoretical morphospace” ( 2007 , 
pp. 90–2) actually focusses on a theoretical morphospace that models  diversity in a single clade, 
namely the bryozoans (McKinney and  Raup 198 2). 
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as a character and (2) that all characters across all clades are of equal signifi cance or 
contribute equally to  biodiversity . To make this more concrete, we would have to 
assume that there is a fact of the matter as to how many characters contribute to the 
evolution of human cognition and that the biodiversity represented by the evolution 
of human cognition is of the same magnitude as the evolution of an equivalent num-
ber of characters in some other clade(s) for some other purpose(s). 
 Conclusion 
 We have argued that uncertainty about the application of the current maze of mea-
sures of  biodiversity results, in part, from uncertainty about our reasons for conserv-
ing biodiversity in general. This is problematic for decisions about large- scale 
conservation, particularly where such conservation includes species and ecosystems 
whose instrumental value is currently unknown. We have argued that, in such cases, 
use of a general measure of biodiversity is justifi ed on the grounds that it will best 
hedge our bets against current and future uncertainty about the location of instru-
mental value and the needs and preferences of human populations. If we are right, a 
general measure of biodiversity should aim at the maximisation of feature  diversity . 
The most effective and tractable such measure will be one based on phylogenetic 
diversity. 
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